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Abstract: In recent years, consumer choice has become an important element of public policy. 
One reason is that consumers differ in their tastes and needs, which they can express most easily 
through their own choices. Elements that strengthen consumer choice feature prominently in the 
design of public insurance markets, for instance in the United States in the recent introduction of 
prescription drug coverage for older individuals via Medicare Part D. For policy makers who 
design such a market, an important practical question in the design phase of such a new program 
is how to deduce enrollment and plan selection preferences prior to its introduction. In this paper, 
we investigate whether hypothetical choice experiments can serve as a tool in this process. We 
combine data from hypothetical and real plan choices, elicited around the time of the introduction 
of Medicare Part D. We first analyze how well the hypothetical choice data predict willingness to 
pay and market shares at the aggregate level. We then analyze predictions at the individual level, 
in particular how insurance demand varies with observable characteristics. We also explore 
whether the extent of adverse selection can be predicted using hypothetical choice data alone. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, consumer choice has become an important element of public policy. One reason is 
that consumers differ in their tastes and needs, which they can express most easily through their 
own choices. Elements that strengthen consumer choice feature prominently in the design of 
public insurance markets, for instance in the United States in the recent introduction of 
prescription drug coverage for older individuals via Medicare Part D (see, inter alia, McFadden et 
al. 2008).  
 
For policy makers, an important practical question in the design phase of such a new program is 
how to deduce enrollment and plan preferences prior to its introduction. For instance, if plan 
sponsors are required to enroll any eligible individuals, as it is the case in Medicare Part D, will 
those individuals who are considered to be particularly vulnerable enroll? How severe will adverse 
selection be? In this paper, we investigate whether hypothetical choice experiments can serve as a 
tool to answer such questions in the design phase of a new program. We combine data from 
hypothetical and real plan choices, elicited around the time of the introduction of Medicare Part D. 
We first analyze how well the hypothetical choice data predict willingness to pay and market 
shares at the aggregate level. We then analyze predictions at the individual level, in particular how 
insurance demand varies with observable characteristics. We also explore whether the extent of 
adverse selection can be predicted using hypothetical choice data alone.  
 
Consumer preferences for private goods provided within, or subsidized by, government programs 
can be deduced either from consumer behavior observed in relation to similar policies in the past 
or in different regions (“revealed preference”), or through “stated preference” methods. There are 
different ways of letting consumers state their preferences: They can be asked to directly rank or 
rate attributes; products can be auctioned; or consumers can be asked to choose between two or 
more alternatives that vary in their attributes. The latter approach is known as hypothetical choice 
experiment in which individuals are presented with the same type of choice situation they would 
be facing after the introduction of the policy. In the economics profession, there has long since 
been a discussion about whether stated preferences methods do accurately represent consumers’ 
preferences. Arrow et al (1993), and Harrison and List (2004), and Bohm (2008) review stated 
preference methods and assess their scope and limitations. Our analysis exploits the introduction 
of Medicare Part D to inform this debate. Despite this being an old debate, it is still quite topical, 
for instance because of the design choices U.S. states face when it comes to the introduction of 
the health insurance exchanges mandated by the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA). 
 
The hypothetical choice experiment on the demand for Medicare Part D plans we analyze was 
conducted in May 2006, just after the initial enrollment period for Part D had ended. The 
experiment was part of the Retirement Perspective Survey (RPS), an online survey of a 
representative sample of older Americans. Survey respondents were asked to choose between 
insurance contracts that differ in their level of coverage. They are also given the option not to 
have prescription drug coverage at all. The experiment was not designed to reflect the complexity 
of the enrolment decision (which we analyzed elsewhere, e.g. Winter et al., 2006; Heiss et al., 
2009); rather the experiment concentrated on the desired level of plan generosity conditional on 
enrollment. The RPS also elicited detailed background variables, measures of prior year drug use, 
and data on Medicare Part D plan choices among those who could make an active decision 
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(Winter et al. 2006; Heiss et al. 2006). We thus can analyze hypothetical and real plan choices 
jointly, using a variety of discrete choice models that are tailored to the nature of the data and the 
substantive questions at hand.  
 
We first analyze how well the hypothetical choice data predict willingness to pay and market 
shares at the aggregate level. We then analyze predictions at the individual level, in particular 
how insurance demand varies with observable characteristics. We also explore whether the extent 
of adverse selection can be predicted using hypothetical choice data alone. We report several 
interesting findings. Hypothetical and real data produce similar estimates of willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for insurance plan attributes. Even though there are some differences in these estimates, 
our data suggest that hypothetical choice data can be used to predict demand on newly introduced 
insurance markets, perhaps with some refinements of the hypothetical choice tasks. Where we 
find differences between the estimates for the hypothetical and real choice data, they are likely 
due to a specific feature of the real market, namely, that not obtaining insurance is the default. 
We also find evidence for adverse selection in the analysis of both hypothetical and real choices, 
which suggests that hypothetical choice tasks might be used to predict the degree of adverse 
selection on newly introduced insurance markets as well.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the literature 
relevant to our analysis. We then describe the survey from which our data are taken and the 
design of the hypothetical choice experiment in section 3. The discrete-choice models of 
insurance plan demand and the results are described in section 4. Results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature and implications for our study design 
 
We begin by reviewing the literature on hypothetical choice experiments and their relation to the 
analysis of real decisions for the underlying products. We then present some results from the 
existing literature on the demand for insurance coverage in the new Medicare Part D market. We 
also relate the literature to the approach taken in our study. 
 
 
2.1 Hypothetical choices and real decisions 
 
Random utility theory has been the cornerstone of most empirical studies using observational or 
survey data to analyze consumer demand at the individual level (see McFadden, 2001, for a 
review of the approach and its history). In this framework, each product is defined as a bundle of 
characteristics; for example in the analysis of travel demand, each mode of travel is defined by 
the price and time of travel. Consumer preferences are defined over these characteristics, and the 
utility consumers obtain from buying a product depends both on the product’s and their personal 
characteristics and tastes, which can only be partially observed by the researcher. 
 
Consumer surveys provide data on the respondents’ purchasing decisions in real markets. The 
preferences researchers deduce from this information are called revealed preferences because 
people reveal their preferences by making (and reporting) their choices. The advantage of 
deducing preferences from consumers’ actual choices is that they spend real money facing their 
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actual budget constraints and, therefore, the researcher may be confident about making 
predictions based on econometric models using such data. However, making predictions from 
observed choices has some important limitations. First, in real markets the attributes of products 
often exhibit little variation. For example, in many markets, price varies very little over products 
as well as over time. In a statistical model, the researcher might thus wrongfully deduce that 
consumer decisions do not respond much to variations in price, when in reality prices do not vary 
much because price elasticity is very high. Second, when forecasting demand for new products, 
revealed preference data simply do not exist. The same holds true for certain public goods, which 
are not traded in the market. Third, choices might be observed for a selected group of consumers 
only. When drawing conclusions or making predictions, for example what happens if a certain 
insurance coverage is extended to a larger group of consumers, researchers may want to have 
variation not only in product, but also in consumer characteristics. With regard to Part D, there is 
another limitation to drawing conclusions from consumers’ choices to their preferences. As it is 
an insurance market for the elderly, consumers might use choice aids, or they might be supported 
in making their choices by relatives and/or caregivers. In fact, in our data, of those consumers 
who remained uninsured, about 7.5 percent said that someone else had helped, but they had made 
the ultimate choice themselves; while 5.4 percent said that someone else made the choice for 
them. Among those who signed up for a Part D plan, these percentages are much higher: 29 
percent versus 6.2 percent respectively. 
 
To overcome these problems, individuals have been asked to state their preferences. Preferences 
elicited from this type of experiments are called stated preferences in contrast to consumers’ 
revealed preferences from their real choices. Researchers can directly ask for WTP. They can 
also infer WTP from individuals’ hypothetical choices.  In hypothetical choice tasks, respondents 
are asked to choose among alternatives from a choice set whose attributes have been defined by 
the researcher. This allows the researcher to give estimations on the overall utility of the 
alternatives as well as their attributes 
 
For example, in our data respondents are asked to choose between different insurance contracts 
whose prices vary randomly. Hypothetical choice experiments have been used extensively in 
public policy analysis, in marketing and psychology. Louviere et al. (2000) and Street and 
Burgess (2007) provide a comprehensive guide to the design, implementation and interpretation 
of stated choice methods. In these experiments, sufficient variation can be created. Additionally, 
the researcher can hold fixed everything in the choice situation that he wants to hold fixed, and 
concentrate only on the product characteristics that he is really interested in. This helps to 
overcome the well-known problem that prices are correlated with unobserved product quality, 
which leads to biases in the estimate of consumer price elasticity in real data. 
 
As in every experiment, researchers are concerned with the external validity of stated choice 
experiments. Carson et al. (1996) and Murphy (2005) have performed a meta-analysis comparing 
WTP estimates from stated and revealed preference counterparts, and they find that the stated 
WTP is slightly lower than real WTP. Of course, many concerns regarding hypothetical choice 
experiments can be avoided by carefully designing them (Mitchell and Carson 1989, Arrow et al. 
1993).  As in every survey or experiment, wording, sequencing and context have to be designed 
carefully in order for respondents to understand the situation and in order to avoid biases 
(through, for example, strategic response behavior.)  
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Until now, stated preference experiments have mainly been evaluated in the laboratory or in other 
group settings such as classrooms or church halls, thus in a highly artificial situation with a 
selected group of respondents (Murphy et al. 2005). These evaluations were either done for 
public goods like the avoidance of environmental damage or contributions to a charity (see the 
papers cited in Murphy et al. 2003) where respondents are unfamiliar with stating willingness to 
pay and it is difficult to argue what “true” WTP should be. Or they have been tested for private 
goods with very low economics stakes, usually below $10 (examples include baseball cards (List 
et al. 2006), insurance (Balistreri et al. 2001) and all kinds of agricultural commodities like fish, 
fruit and meat (for example Alfnes et al. 2006, Chang et al. 2009, Lusk and Schroeder 2004). 1 
 
The design of our hypothetical choice experiment addresses some of the concerns that have been 
brought up in the literature, and it addresses a substantive question that is, arguably, of much 
more general interest than those studies in some of the earlier literature. 
 
First, respondents might strategically overstate or understate their WTP, or respond in a way that 
they think is socially desirably or “politically correct” (Bohm 2008). We expect this to hold true 
more in the public good setting and not in the insurance setting that we will apply the 
hypothetical choice experiments to. Also, it is perhaps more salient to a respondent that by 
strategically biasing a reported WTP, she can influence public policy. In a hypothetical choice 
experiment such as ours, with a more complicated structure and WTP only being inferred form 
the choice data, it is not immediately clear how the respondent might bias her responses in order 
to affect a policy decision. In fact, choice-based methods have been found to lead to less bias than 
open-ended WTP elicitation formats (Murphy et al. 2005).  
 
The second type of concern is related to the hypothetical nature of stated choice methods. The 
sample drawn for experiments might not be representative of the population, the situation 
presented in a laboratory might be artificial, and the choices presented might be unfamiliar to 
respondents (Murphy et al. 2005). For example, a sample of undergraduate students might not be 
a representative sample or the population for eliciting WTP. In private goods markets, individual 
self-select into the market; in the case of public goods, the policy maker has to decide on whom 
to include in the relevant market. The sample of respondents we use in our data is a random 
sample of the relevant population, and the insurance decision they are facing in the hypothetical 
choice task mirrors the decision they are facing in the real market.  
 
 
 
2.2 Insurance plan demand in the Medicare Part D market 
 
Since its introduction in 1965, Medicare provides health insurance for elderly and disabled 
Americans. In 2008, enrollment was at about 45 million.2 Individuals are eligible for Medicare if 
they are U.S. citizens or long-term legal residents of at least 65 years of age and if either they or 
                                                 
1
 There is, of course, a fair number of choice experiments with stakes that were economically relevant (such as the 
study of student versus church samples in Blackburn, Harrison, Rutström, 1994), but these experiments compared 
hypothetical choices of different groups of individuals, not hypothetical and real choices. 
2
 There are several websites which provide information on Medicare: www.cms.hhs.gov, www.medicare.gov and 
www.statehealthfacts.org. 
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their spouses have paid Medicare taxes for at least ten years.3 Before the introduction of 
Medicare Part D in 2006, only pharmaceutical treatments administered in a physician’s office, in 
a hospital or other institution were covered by the program. This was a major drawback since 
only a subset of Medicare beneficiaries had prescription drug coverage from some other sources, 
while about 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had little or no prescription drug coverage 
(Winter et al., 2006; Neuman et al., 2007). This had serious negative consequences. Medical 
expenditures placed a major financial burden on the elderly.4 Moreover, cost-related non-
adherence, i.e. the discontinuation of medication because it is too expensive, was a big concern 
before the introduction of Part D (Madden et al., 2008). 
 
The aims of Medicare Part D were to make drug insurance coverage affordable for the elderly 
with low incomes, to provide protection against catastrophic drug costs and to reduce cost-related 
non-adherence.5 The key feature of Part D is that the market is administered by the government, 
but private companies offer their products to consumers who choose contracts and carriers. Under 
Part D, consumers can choose between contracts providing standardized basic coverage that is 
subsidized by the government, or contracts that offer more extensive coverage at additional cost. 
The market is designed to increase the efficiency of the allocation of health care resources by 
confronting consumers with the full marginal cost of the services they use. Thus, Part D gives 
important insights into the practicality of Consumer Directed Health Care (CDHC) at least for the 
elderly. Further, as with the introduction of Medicare Part D, both contracts and prices available 
to consumers changed, Medicare Part D can act as a natural experiment of consumer behavior in 
real-world decision situations that are characterized by complexity, ambiguity and important 
consequences. A rapidly increasing body of research has drawn important lessons about the 
demand for prescription drug insurance, and the design of insurance markets more generally, 
from Medicare Part D. 
 
Heiss et al. (2006) and Winter et al. (2006) find that, by and large, Medicare Part D has been a 
success in providing a large percentage of the Medicare eligible population with prescription drug 
coverage. Enrollment rates were above 90 percent in the first year of Medicare Part D. Those 
who remained without coverage in 2006 belong to two very different consumer groups: Those in 
relatively good health and those potentially difficult to reach. Furthermore, the complexity of the 
market with its many providers and many different products may have resulted in suboptimal 
choices, especially among the most vulnerable – those with low income, low educational 
attainment, poor health or some cognitive impairment. While most consumers have made rational 
decisions regarding the question whether they should enroll at all, they had some problems in 
deciding which plan was optimal for them. 
 
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) find that elders’ decisions depart from optimization under full 
information: They find that actual premiums are the main driver of consumers’ choices, and that 
                                                 
3
 Further, disabled U.S. citizens or those with end stage renal disease are eligible for the program. However, we 
concentrate on the elderly beneficiaries here who form the vast majority of over 80 percent of beneficiaries. 
4
 According to data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, per-person expenditures among Medicare recipients 
for prescription drugs were equal to $1789 in 2003, with more than half of this paid out-of-pocket and just about 8 
percent paid for by the Medicare program (Duggan and Scott-Morton, 2008). 
5
 There exists a subsidy that recipients whose incomes are at or below 135 percent of the poverty line can apply for 
(the so-called low-income subsidy, or LIS). Estimations for 2008 show that 12.5 million Medicare beneficiaries are 
eligible for LIS, with 9.4 million actually receiving it. Certain groups of Medicare recipients are automatically 
enrolled in the subsidy, for example those on Medicaid (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). 
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too little weight is placed on expected out-of-pocket costs. Further, financial characteristics of a 
plan (for example, providing gap coverage or no deductible) are valued beyond any impacts on 
their own financial expenses or risk. They use a dataset of prescription drug claims matched to 
information on the characteristics of the choice set. A limitation of their data is that they cover 
only consumers with Part D stand-alone who moreover also filed a prescription drug claim. (In 
our study, we presented the hypothetical plan choice task to these consumers as well.) Abaluck 
and Gruber (2011) estimate a (monthly) WTP of $25 for full donut hole coverage, $4.17 for 
generic donut hole coverage, and $6.67 for going from a deductible of $250 to a deductible of 
zero. 
 
Kling et al. (2012) test whether individuals make rational decisions regarding Part D – an 
environment with complex choices. They can reject the null hypothesis of choice stability and 
thus accurately perceived prices. Consumers who are provided with personalized information on 
how different drug plans affect their out-of-pocket costs make different decisions to consumers 
who are not provided with such information. The authors conclude that consumers had 
misperceived the influence of drug costs on prices before the intervention. Their results are based 
on a group of patients from a particular hospital, which raises the question in how far their results 
can be generalized. 
 
Frakt and Pizer (2010) and Lucarelli et al. (2008) use aggregate data for demand estimation using 
the approach of Berry (1994). Both papers use the prescription drug plan finder to generate a 
dataset with region-plan pairs of stand-alone Part D plans. Frakt and Pizer (2009) estimate a 
premium elasticity of demand for the active deciders of (-1.45). Lucarelli et al. (2008) estimate 
that (monthly) WTP for eliminating the deductible is $3.83, while WTP for obtaining gap 
coverage of branded drugs is $36.92. 
 
Overall, the introduction of Part D is seen as a success story in the sense that more seniors are 
now provided with affordable coverage. Some vulnerable groups, however, have not profited 
from the introduction. Further, adverse selection is driving those plans with extensive coverage 
out of the market. Our analysis of consumer decisions will shed some additional light on these 
findings 
 
 
3. Data  
 
In this section, we present the data we use in our empirical analysis. We first describe the 
Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS), and then the hypothetical choice experiment that was part 
of RPS 2006. 
 
3.1 The Retirement Perspectives Survey 
 
The Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS) was conducted in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 in order 
to elicit information on enrollment decisions, knowledge, and opinions regarding Medicare Part 
D. The RPS questionnaires were administered over the internet to an age-restricted, random 
sample drawn from a panel of individuals maintained by Knowledge Networks, a commercial 
survey firm. These surveys collected information on prescription drug use, health conditions, 
socio-economic status, and household demographic composition. Winter et al. (2006) and Heiss 
 8
et al. (2011) provide detailed descriptions of the RPS design and data. In the present paper, we 
concentrate on the hypothetical choice experiment that was fielded as part of the second RPS 
wave in May 2006, just after the initial enrollment period for Medicare Part D had ended. 
 
Despite being an internet survey, the RPS is fairly representative of the US non-institutionalized 
population in the relevant age group in terms of demographics and socio-economic status. This is 
because members of the KN Panel are recruited offline using random-digit dialing, and those who 
are willing to participate but not internet users are provided by KN with internet access, 
hardware, and training. Table 1 compares the RPS 2006 sample we analyze in the present paper 
to the 2006 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in terms of socio-economic characteristics and 
insurance status. The RPS seems to reasonably mirror the HRS, even more in the weighted 
samples. A more detailed analysis of the RPS samples can be found in Heiss et al. (2011). 
 
For our analysis, we are only interested in those individuals eligible for Medicare, therefore we 
restrict the sample to respondents aged 65 and older in 2006. Since one of the main aims of this 
paper is to combine and compare respondents’ real and hypothetical choices, we restrict the 
working sample for the subsequent econometric analysis to those respondents who had to make 
an active decision whether to enroll in Part D, and which plan to select, in the real market. Thus, 
we exclude all respondents who already had prescription drug coverage before the introduction of 
Part D from other sources such as the previous employer (about 74 percent of the RPS 
respondents). In the remaining sample of respondents who had no prescription drug insurance 
before the introduction of Part D (the “active deciders”), many also remained without insurance 
for 2006. An important advantage of our design is that in the hypothetical choice task, 
respondents could also decide to obtain no insurance. Thus, the hypothetical task mimics the real-
word enrollment and (conditional on enrollment) plan generosity decisions made by active 
deciders.  
 
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our analysis can be found in Table 
2. Most variables are constructed directly from responses to survey questions, with the exception 
of the variable “expected drug costs”. This variable was created by Winter et al. (2006) based on 
respondents’ self-reported prescription drug use and the full price they would have paid for them 
over the counter. This variable approximates the drug bill an individual would have to pay if she 
had no insurance. The dependent variables, hypothetical and real choices in the Medicare Part D 
market for insurance coverage, are described below. 
 
 
3.2 The hypothetical choice experiment 
 
In RPS 2006, a hypothetical choice experiment was conducted in order to elicit the preferences 
for prescription drug coverage. As the RPS focuses on questions on Medicare Part D and as all 
respondents in the RPS 2006 wave, fielded in May 2006, have already answered a (similar but 
not identical) questionnaire on Medicare Part D in RPS 2005, fielded in November 2005, we 
expect respondents to be familiar with questions on insurance and the Medicare Part D market 
when taking part in the hypothetical choice experiment. 
 
Consumers were provided with a short introduction, in order to place our hypothetical choice 
experiment in the context of Part D. For instance, they were reminded that the same late 
enrollment penalties would apply in the hypothetical choice situations as stipulated in the real-
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world Part D regulation. Also, the introduction text to the hypothetical choice experiment was 
adjusted slightly to reflect the fact that there are, for our purposes, three types of consumers; 
those who had purchased Part D stand-alone coverage for 2006 (who might be called “active 
deciders”), those who had coverage for 2006 from other sources (passive demand), and those 
who did not have coverage for 2006. The exact wording of the survey experiment can be found in 
the appendix of this paper. All respondents were told that they should consider plan choice 
starting from a situation with no prescription drug coverage at all. 
 
The attributes of the hypothetical plans were chosen such that the hypothetical market has the 
same type of plans as the real one. Under Medicare Part D, the plans insurers can offer are 
standardized. The standard drug benefit, as defined by the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, is characterized by four main features6: 
 
• A $250 (annual) deductible below which the insured have to pay for all costs them- 
selves. 
• An interval of drug spending between $250 and $2,250 where the plan covers 75 
percent of drug costs. 
• A coverage gap between $2,250 and $5,100 where the insured has to bear the full costs. 
• A (“catastrophic expenses”) threshold of $5,100 above which the insurance covers 95 
percent of all costs. Companies can either offer the standard plans, or plans that offer 
more extensive coverage, either by having no deductible or by providing coverage in 
the coverage gap 
 
Respondents were given a choice between four alternatives with randomly varying premiums:  
 
1. No prescription drug coverage.  
2. The basic plan, which corresponds exactly to Part D basic coverage.  
3. An enhanced plan which is just like the basic plan, but without deductible and  
4. A premier plan which offers gap coverage in addition to having no deductible. 
 
 
Each respondent was presented with three different hypothetical choice tasks. In the first round, 
everybody was presented with the same hypothetical prices, and in the second and third round, 
prices were randomly assigned to the respondents. Table 3 shows the range of premiums that 
were assigned to the different types of plans in our hypothetical choice experiment, and thus our 
hypothetical supply prices, along with the premiums that were available in the real market for 
Part D plans in 2006. For the first choice, premiums were the same for all respondents. These 
premiums closely resemble the premiums for all plans available in the market as constructed by 
Heiss et al. (2009) using public data provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). Note that the premiums for the plans actually chosen by the RPS respondents, and 
therefore the prices in market equilibrium, are somewhat lower than supply prices, at least for 
basic and enhanced coverage. For the second and third choice, premiums were randomly 
assigned.7 
 
                                                 
6
 Features of the plan have changed slightly over time. These are the features of the plan in 2006, when our first 
hypothetical choice experiment was conducted.  
7
 Table A.1 in the appendix contains the premium values for all 26 treatments. 
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In the real market, respondents’ choice sets consist of all plans that are available in their region, 
i.e., between 38 and 52 plans. The insurance plans in the real market differ in more dimensions 
than the hypothetical market. The plan described in the hypothetical market is described as one 
that “covers all prescription drugs you currently need and most of what you might need in the 
future“, while in reality, coverage might be more limited. Plans might only provide gap coverage 
for generics but not for brand name drugs. There might be drug tiers, or certain drugs might not 
be covered or only with prior authorization. Also, in the real market, Part D stand-alone plans 
comprise both those with Part D basic coverage and actuarily equivalent plans; these are 
combined into one category in our hypothetical plans.  
 
We chose to leave some plan features unspecified in the hypothetical choice task to keep it 
simple. Thus, our choice scenario is incomplete in the sense of Manski (1999). The information 
respondents have on the hypothetical plans is a subset of the information they would have in the 
real choice setting.  As long as respondents have rational expectations about the dimensions of 
the alternatives that are missing in the hypothetical task, we nevertheless obtain consistent 
estimates using the hypothetical choice data.  
  
 
4. Econometric models 
 
In this section, we discuss the econometric models we use to analyze the data from hypothetical 
and real choices. In addition to the substantive question of how these data can be used to analyze 
the demand on a newly introduced market, we also address the methodological issues of how 
flexible a discrete choice model should be when data from hypothetical and real choices are to be 
combined. Our modeling strategy addresses three issues in hypothetical choice experiments: 
First, we usually observe repeated choices of one decision maker. This can cause correlation in 
the unobserved parts of utility and thus contradict the assumptions of the multinomial logit 
model. Second, there might be heterogeneity in the valuation of attributes in the population over 
and above the heterogeneity caused by observed characteristics like income and risk. One 
possibility to take into account taste heterogeneity and the fact that we observe repeated choices 
are mixed logit models. Third, as in the multinomial logit framework, utility coefficients are only 
identified relative to the variance of unobserved factors, differences in the utility coefficients of 
hypothetical and real choices might be wrongfully attributed to differences in valuation of 
attributes, when in reality, it is just the variances that differ. We investigate this by allowing for 
different variances of the real and hypothetical choices.  
 
The general framework is that of random utility maximization. Let the (indirect) utility that 
consumer i obtains from the insurance contract j be 
 
Uij = V(aj,pj,ci,hij) + eij 
 
where aj is a vector of attributes of insurance contract j; pj is the contract’s premium; ci are the 
drug costs of the consumers in the year before choices were made (which are a good predictor of 
the drug costs in the year for which choices are made, see Heiss et al., 2012); hij is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the choices are observed in a hypothetical task or in the real 
market; and eij is the error term that contains the impact of all unobservable factors. 
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The attributes of the insurance contracts we consider are (see also Table 2): 
 
• Drug tiers:  A dummy variable indicating whether the plan divides drugs into tiers with 
different levels of co-payments.  
• Insurance: A dummy variable indicating whether the contract provides prescription drug 
coverage with copayments, deductible and gap coverage equal to the Part D standard benefit. 
• No deductible: A dummy variable indicating whether the contract does not have the $250 
deductible of the Part D benefit. 
• Gap coverage (generics): A dummy variable indicating whether the contract additionally 
provides coverage in the coverage gap for generics. 
• Gap coverage (brand name drugs): A dummy variable indicating whether the contract 
additionally provides coverage in the coverage gap for generics. 
• Premium: The plan’s monthly premium in dollars. 
• Top 100 drugs uncovered: The number of top 100 drugs missing from the formulary. 
• Top 100 drugs with authorization: The number of top 100 drugs only covered after 
authorization or step therapy. 
 
We assume that the decision maker chooses the alternative with the highest utility Uij. We first 
estimate a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) (e.g. McFadden, 1976). In this model, observable 
explanatory variables enter via a linear index, while the unobservables, eij, are assumed to be i.i.d. 
random variables from an Extreme Value Type I distribution with density function 
 
f (eij ) = exp(−eij ) ∗ exp(−exp(−eij )).  
 
In order to be able to take into account preference heterogeneity, but also the fact that we observe 
several choices by the same individual, we also estimate mixed logit models. These models allow 
for preference heterogeneity since the utility contributions of the different attributes may vary 
over decision makers. To obtain choice probabilities, which are straightforward in the standard 
MNL model, one has to integrate out the distribution of the coefficients (for a discussion of 
mixed logit models, see for example McFadden and Train, 2000, or Train, 2003).  Note also that 
we observe three hypothetical choices per respondent, which will be reflected in a panel-like 
structure of the models. 
 
Our main interest lies in estimating and predicting consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for drug 
insurance with different levels of coverage. WTP is defined as the amount of premium increase 
that exactly offsets the increase of an attribute by one unit (or in the discrete case, the amount of 
premium that exactly offsets being provided with the discrete attribute versus not being provided 
with it), so that total utility remains unaffected. In the discrete choice models we consider, where 
product attributes and price (the premium) enter via a linear index, under quite general conditions 
willingness to pay for an attribute is given by the negative ratio of its coefficient and the 
coefficient of the premium: 
 
WTP = −(βattribute/βpremium).  
 
Within this general framework, we estimate three classes of model specifications sequentially. 
We describe these specifications in the remainder of this section. In the following, we distinguish 
between parameters estimated using data on hypothetical and real choices by using the subscripts 
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SP (stated preferences) and RP (revealed preferences). The results (parameter estimates and 
implied WTPs) are presented in section 5 for each model and specification in turn; we also 
present extended specifications of these models to characterize adverse selection in this market. 
 
 
4.1 Standard multinomial logit models, estimated with hypothetical and real decision data 
separately  
 
We start our by estimating standard MNL models separately with data on hypothetical and real 
decisions. Thus, we allow the coefficients to be different in both types of data. Moreover, the 
coefficients are constant over decision makers. Finally, the standard errors are clustered by 
respondent in the stated preference model where three hypothetical choices are observed. 
 
The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 4, specifications (1) and (2); the implied WTPs 
are reported in Table 5. 
 
 
4.2 Standard multinomial logit models, estimated with combined data on hypothetical and 
real decisions 
 
Next, we present models that combine stated and revealed preference data in a joint estimation. 
The simplest such model is the standard MNL model; results are reported in specifications (3) in 
Table 7; the implied WTPs are reported in Table 7. We extend these specifications in our analysis 
of adverse selection; those results are reported in specification (8) reported in Table 11. 
 
 
4.3 Multinomial logit models, estimated with combined data on hypothetical and real 
decisions, allowing for differences in scale factors 
 
Estimating discrete choice models requires some type of normalization because utility is a 
cardinal variable. In the case of the logit model, the variance is normalized to pi2/6. Thus, the 
estimated βs are estimates of the “real” βs, divided by λ which is defined by the (unknown) 
variance σ2 of the unobserved factors: 
 
σ
2
 = λ
2
pi
2/6. 
 
In other words, the “true” βs cannot be identified separately from σ2, and when we compare the 
coefficients from two data sources, we will never know whether differences result from 
differences in the true parameters or the variance of unobserved factors. 
 
While the coefficients in respondents’ utility functions should be the same in both types of data, 
unobserved factors will differ in stated and revealed preference situations. We would expect the 
real choices of respondents to be affected by many more unobserved factors than their stated 
choices. On the other hand, respondents face repeated choices in the hypothetical choice tasks, 
which could blow up the variances.  
 
Therefore, when estimating a joint model of the stated and revealed preferences, we want to 
allow for different scale factors λSP and λRP (see Morikawa, 1989, and Louviere et al., 2000), 
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assuming that the true utility parameters are the same for the two data sets. As the scale factors 
are unobserved and can never be identified within one source of data, it is the convention to 
normalize λRP to unity such that λSP represents the stated preference relative to the revealed 
preference scale factor. 
 
The first version of these models that we estimate imposes the restriction that ßSP / λSP = ßRP. As 
before, the coefficients are constant over decision makers, and the standard errors are clustered 
by respondent. Results are reported in Table 7, specification (4), and the implied WTPs are 
reported in Table 8; the extended version that allows us to characterize adverse selection is 
presented in specification (9), Table 11. 
 
A second version eases the restriction that the utility coefficients are identical for hypothetical 
and real choices, which implies that ßSP / λSP and ßRP differ. Still, the coefficients are constant 
over decision makers, and the standard errors are clustered by respondent. Results are reported in 
Table 7, specification (5), and the implied WTPs are again reported in Table 8. We also present 
an adverse selection specification (10) in Table 11. 
 
 
4.4 Mixed logit models, estimated with combined data on hypothetical and real decisions 
 
The final class of models we estimate, again with combined data on hypothetical and real 
decisions, allows utility coefficients to vary between respondents but restricts them to be identical 
for hypothetical and real choices (ßSP = ßRP). Letting the coefficients vary between, but not 
within, the decision makers reflects the repeated nature of the choice tasks. 
 
We specify two versions of mixed logit models. The first one, specification (6) in Table 9, 
assumes a normal mixing distribution for some of the parameters. Specifically, the coefficients 
for the attributes “insurance”, “no deductible” and “gap coverage for brandname drugs” are 
assumed to be normally distributed among respondents. The second one assumes that the 
coefficient of the attribute “insurance” is normally distributed, while those of “no deductible” and 
“gap coverage for brandname drugs” are lognormally distributed among decision makers. Results 
for this second specification are reported in specification (7) in Table 9. WTPs for both 
specifications are reported in Table 10. 
 
 
5. Results  
 
Our sample contains 410 respondents. In the hypothetical market, each respondent faces 3 
repeated choices between 4 contracts (including the choice of no insurance), with randomly 
varying premiums. In real market every decision maker has between 38 and 52 plans to choose 
from, depending on the plans offered in the respective state he lives in (including the choice of no 
insurance). Real contracts different in more dimensions: gap coverage can be generic, drug tiers, 
top 100 drugs uncovered, authorization.  
 
Tables 4 and 5 allow a first glance at our data, with separate estimates of the hypothetical and real 
choices (Table 4) and the respective estimates of WTP (Table 5). The reported parameters are 
those of a linear indirect utility function, relative to the variance of the unobserved part of utility. 
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These parameters are smaller in hypothetical choices. All parameter estimates have the expected 
signs. Consumers place a positive valuation on having insurance, and their utility is even bigger 
when additionally they have no deductibles and gap coverage. The probability of choosing a plan 
decreases in the plan’s premium and also in each top 100 drug which is not covered or only 
covered with authorization. The choice probability also decreases when the plan has several tiers 
with different copayments.  
 
We cannot reject equality of the WTPs for joint attributes, except take-up (insurance). 
Interestingly, the estimated WTPs for not having a deductible are quite close to $250 (the upper 
bound of what consumers should be willing to pay) both in the hypothetical and in the real data.  
The annualized estimates are $177 for the real data (Table 5, column (1)) and $267 for the 
hypothetical data (Table 5, column (2)). The latter is large, but also not very precisely estimated. 
A possible explanation for the high WTP for avoiding a deductible is that the large majority of 
those consumers who have insurance coverage (82 percent) have drug costs that exceed the 
deductible. In the following, we discuss the differences and similarities between the hypothetical 
and real choices more systematically, in order to shed light on what can be learned from 
hypothetical data. 
 
In Table 6, we show estimates and confidence intervals of the ratios of the WTPs obtained from 
the hypothetical and real decisions. We see that this ratio is significantly larger than one for the 
take-up of insurance (we will come back to this later). A ratio of 1 is within the confidence 
interval for the WTP ratios for “no deductible” and “gap coverage”. However, at least for the 
deductible choice, the confidence interval for the ratio is quite large, ranging from hypothetical 
WTP being at about 2/3 of real WTP to hypothetical WTP being twice as large as real WTP.   
 
In the remainder of this section, we consider the models that combine the data from hypothetical 
and real choices. The emphasis here is what can be learned using hypothetical and real choice 
data jointly to learn about consumers’ valuation of the different insurance attributes. The choice 
structure and the product attributes can be controlled hypothetical choice experiment. However, 
these design choices also need to be reflected in the econometrics analysis. In the following, we 
discuss the following issues: defaults and implicitly defined attributes, differences in variances, 
the repeated nature of the hypothetical choice tasks and, related to this, taste heterogeneity.  
 
An important aspect of the Medicare Part D enrollment and plan selection process is the default 
option – all eligible individuals without prior coverage, the active deciders, who do not take a 
decision, remain uninsured. In our data, in the real market 94 of our 410 respondents remained 
uninsured. In our hypothetical choice task, we did not implement this default. Rather, all 
respondents had to pick, in each of the three choice tasks, one of four alternatives, which included 
remaining uninsured. Thus, in our hypothetical choice experiment, the choice between different 
insurance contracts should be better reflected than the enrollment process per se.  
 
 
Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates obtained from models of the combined hypothetical and 
real choice data. Model 3 imposes equality of both unobserved variances and coefficients 
between the two types of data. Significance and direction of the coefficients are like in the 
separate choices; to interpret their magnitudes, it helps looking at WTP (Table 8). WTP for the 
joint model again shows sensible magnitudes in general. While WTP for insurance per se is 
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estimated to be quite low due to low take-up when only analyzing real choices, the joint model 
predicts higher take-up.  
 
Next, we want to analyze differences in the variance of unobserved variables between real and 
hypothetical choices. We estimate a multinomial logit model in which the variance of the error 
term in the latent utility model differs by data source. The estimated heteroskedasticity parameter 
is significantly different from zero, so the variances in the hypothetical and real choices appear to 
differ. We estimate a relative scale factor of exp(heteroskedasticity parameter) = exp(-0.76) = 
0.47. This means that the ratio of the variance from hypothetical to real choice is 1/exp(-0.76)2 = 
4.57.  
 
Note that the estimated WTPs are different in the hypothetical and real data. The different roles 
that the “no insurance” option plays – it is an active choice in the hypothetical and the default in 
real decisions – can explain the rejection of equality of the WTPs for takeup of insurance. We 
return to this issue below. 
 
Model (4) allows not only for variance differences between the hypothetical and real choices, but 
it also allows the utility coefficients to vary between these two type of data sources. Thus, this 
model helps us to analyze whether up and above the differences in variances in the two data sets, 
there are also differences in the estimated parameters (and thus WTP). First note that all 
estimated coefficients from the hypothetical and real choices have the same signs. There are no 
significant differences between the coefficients (and therefore WTP) are not significantly for the 
no deductible and gap coverage option, but significantly higher in the hypothetical choices 
regarding the insurance option. A potential explanation is that the real world, the default option 
was to remain uninsured, while in our hypothetical choices one has to actively decide against 
insurance. Thus, in our specific case, one can learn about choice between different insurance 
options more than about the take-up choice. The conclusion we can draw from this is that defaults 
are not only important in policy, but also in designing HCEs.   
 
Next, consider the mixed logit estimates reported in Table 9, model (6) which allow for taste 
heterogeneity. The standard deviations of the attributes are highly significant and almost of the 
same magnitude as the coefficient themselves which shows that valuation for insurance does 
show a lot of variation in our population. The estimated coefficients are larger than the 
coefficients of the multinomial logit model (Model 3), except for the gap coverage for brand-
name drugs. A larger coefficient for the mixed logit model is expected as a part of the error is 
now explicitly modeled, so the remaining error should be smaller and the estimated coefficients 
larger. The relative difference of the mixed logit and logit coefficients gives an indication of the 
importance of the error coefficients. In our case, it is the coefficient for insurance, which rises 
most strongly in comparison to the multinomial model.  
 
The normal distribution of the attributes’ coefficients carries over to WTP with the standard 
deviation being equal to the standard deviation of the respective normal distribution divided by 
the premium coefficient, which we modeled to be constant. Table 10 shows estimated means and 
standard distributions WTP. Willingness to pay for gap coverage shows great variation within the 
population. Graph 1 shows the predicted distribution of WTP. A disadvantage of using a normal 
mixing distribution is that the support of a normal distribution is from minus infinity to plus 
infinity. This means that a part of the population will be predicted to have negative WTP. 18 
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percent of the population are predicted to have negative WTP for basic insurance, 23 percent for 
having no deductible and 43 for having coverage in the coverage gap.  
 
To avoid the unrealistically high percentage of the population that is predicted to have negative 
WTPs (in particular for gap coverage), we finally estimate a model in which a subset of the 
coefficients is log normally distributed in Model 7.  
 
Table 10 and Graph 1 show the distribution of WTPs.  The variance is largest for the insurance 
coefficient. We see that the mean valuation for insurance is much higher than previously 
estimated, but that the valuation varies considerably in the population. This is what we expected 
as we have a considerable number of consumers who remained uninsured even in this highly 
subsidized market. Mean valuation for gap coverage is quite low, but there are consumers who 
value this extended coverage very highly.  
 
Next, we will analyze whether these differences in valuation are due to expected risk. Thus, we 
turn to the question whether hypothetical choice experiments are a useful tool for analyzing 
observable differences of decision makers. This is important, because policy makers want to learn 
about vulnerable groups, such as consumers with low income, and about the importance of 
adverse selection in an insurance markets. In addition, there might be substantial heterogeneity in 
the population which is important in generalizing the findings from an experiment.  
 
We thus conclude our analysis of hypothetical and real choices with specifications that reveal 
whether there is adverse selection in the Medicare Part D market (Table 11). Specifically, we test 
whether the demand for prescription drug insurance (both hypothetical and real) in the year when 
Part D was introduced depends on prescription drug use in the prior year. For this purpose, we 
add previous year drug use as an additional predictor in three specifications. Specifically, we 
interact a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for “high cost” respondents with the 
generosity features of the offered plans (insurance, no deductible, gap coverage). These 
interactions are generally statistically significant (joint F-test, p < 0.001), in particular the 
interaction of the “high cost” dummy with the “insurance” dummy. Thus, respondents with 
higher levels of drug costs in the previous year are more likely to buy more generous coverage in 
the current year, which indicates that there is adverse selection. Importantly, further interactions 
with dummies for the hypothetical choices are not significant (specification 10), which indicates 
that adverse selection can also be detected by using the data based on the hypothetical choice 
tasks alone.  
 
Finding that respondents choose their drug plans according to their expected drug use has 
different implications for this market. The bright side is that the elderly consumers in our sample 
seem to be able to identify the plans that are best for them, both in the hypothetical and in the real 
markets. This could actually be welfare increasing. On the other hand, adverse selection has well-
known negative consequences for the supply side, and in extreme cases can lead to the complete 
break-down of the market (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). However, in Medicare Part D, the 
negative consequences of adverse selection on the supply side are mitigated through risk 
adjustment by Medicare. Adverse selection does not seem to have had severe negative 
consequences on the market, with the exception of plans with full coverage in the donut hole 
which have disappeared within two year, presumably due to strong adverse selection that was not 
compensated by risk adjustment (Heiss, et al. 2009).  
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Although this was not the intention when we designed these hypothetical choice experiments, 
these findings suggest that it might be possible to predict adverse selection on a new insurance 
market prior to its introduction by presenting a sample of individuals who are potential 
consumers (for instance, eligible individuals in the case of publicly sponsored health insurance) 
with appropriately designed hypothetical choice tasks.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we analyzed data from hypothetical and real choices in the market for Medicare 
Part D prescription drug insurance. We presented and estimated several discrete choice models 
that offer different degrees of flexibility in combining such data in a joint estimation.  
 
One insight from our analysis is that hypothetical choice experiments can be useful tools for 
analyzing and predicting the demand on insurance markets since behavior is clearly related to 
actual behavior. Significance and signs of the estimated coefficients are always the same in the 
real and hypothetical data. Even magnitudes are not statistically different with the exception of 
the take-up decision which in this specific application can be attributed to the role of defaults, an 
issue to which we return shortly. Another difference between our results for the two markets is 
that the hypothetical data predict higher willingness to pay for basic insurance and thus higher 
take-up than the real data. Does this suggest that respondents spend their hypothetical money 
more easily than their real money? Not necessarily: In the real world, the default was to remain 
uninsured, while in our hypothetical choices, “no insurance” required an active decision. This is 
supported by the fact that we do not find significant differences in hypothetical and real choices 
between different attributes of the insurances (“gap coverage” and “no deductible”).   
 
A special feature of the market we look at is that it consists of consumers who had no 
prescription drug insurance before the introduction. Making these consumers take-up insurance 
might require providing strong incentives from the side of the policy maker – having to opt out of 
insurance might be one option. Indeed, a high share of our respondent remains without insurance 
in the real market, even though the standard plans offered are highly subsidized by the 
government. Thus, one part of our respondents seems to have a very low valuation for insurance 
in general.  
 
On the methodological side, we addressed the repeated nature of choices and taste heterogeneity, 
by estimating mixed logit models – and indeed, there is substantial taste heterogeneity especially 
in take-up, but also in the most comprehensive types of insurance. It this heterogeneity caused by 
risk? Thus, is there adverse selection, and how well does our HCE predict adverse selection? 
Since in our data, we observe drug use in the year before the introduction of Part D, we can 
perform an informal test of adverse selection. After controlling for the other covariates, including 
plan attributes, prior year drug costs predict choices both in hypothetical and real choices, which 
we interpret as an indication of adverse selection. Since this effect shows up both in the 
hypothetical and real choices, we would suggest that hypothetical choice tasks can be used to 
predict the degree of adverse selection on newly introduced insurance markets – this is an idea 
that warrants more investigation in future research. Also, our study shows the value of collecting 
rich background data in addition to those that are generated by standard hypothetical choice tasks.  
 
 18
We conclude with some thoughts about the limitations of our design. Combining data on 
hypothetical and real decisions allowed us to assess whether hypothetical choice data alone can 
be used as a tool to analyze and predict demand in a new insurance market that is characterized 
by heavy government subsidies and regulations. Our overall conclusion is that hypothetical 
choice data are useful in this respect, in particular when they are obtained from representative 
samples obtained from the population that faces an (active) decision in the new market. One 
might object that the hypothetical choice experiment was conducted after the initial enrollment 
period ended in May 2006 and that therefore respondents already had some experience with this 
new insurance market. While we acknowledge that this is a concern, we would also argue that if a 
hypothetical choice task is to be used to predict market demand, it is important that consumers 
are well-informed. Thus, our set-up in which consumers have some experience does not seem to 
be entirely unrealistic. Since new programs of the scale of Part D are introduced only very 
infrequently, a controlled experiment that systematically varies the availability of information on 
a market before presenting hypothetical choice tasks might provide additional insights into this 
issue; we leave this to future research. 
 
Our analysis also revealed some important practical concerns. Most importantly, our hypothetical 
choice tasks treated the “no enrollment” option as an active decision (since we were substantively 
interested in its predictors), whereas in the real market where it is the default. We anticipate that 
similar concerns arise in other applications of hypothetical choice tasks as well. A second 
limitation of our study, which is more fundamental, is that even in a relatively simple choice 
situation such as plan selection in Medicare Part D, it is impossible to describe all product 
attributes (insurance plan design features) that might be relevant for a decision maker. Manski 
(1999), who formulated this critique at a general level, suggested using probabilistic choice tasks 
to address the fundamental uncertainty associated with the choice options in hypothetical tasks. 
We anticipate that both problem – the role of defaults and unspecified product attributes – will be 
addressed in future methodological studies and implementations of hypothetical choice tasks in 
the context of public policy design. 
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Appendix: The hypothetical choice experiment in RPS 2006 
 
Introduction (part 1) for respondents without prescription drug coverage: 
 
At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription drug 
coverage for the next year.  
 
 
Introduction (part 1) for respondents with Part D plans (whether stand-alone or HMO/ 
Medicare+Choice): 
 
At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription drug 
coverage for the next year. You may stay in your current plan, you may switch to another plan, or 
you may even elect to unsubscribe and not select any plan. 
 
 
Introduction (part 1) for respondents with other prescription drug coverage, i.e. through their 
employer or union, the Veteran’s Administration, private insurance or from some other source: 
 
Even though you have prescription drug insurance from other sources, we would like to know 
what your choices would be if the only coverage you could get would be through a Part D plan. 
 
 
Introduction (part 2), identical for all respondents: 
 
We are now going to show you some plans that have realistic features and premiums. We are 
interested in what plan you would choose if these were your only options. Specifically, on each of 
the following pages we will show you three plans that differ in coverage and premiums. On each 
page, please report which of these options is the most attractive and which is the least attractive. 
You will always have the option to choose none of these three plans and thus have no 
prescription drug coverage (but then you would have to pay higher premiums if you enroll later, 
according to current Medicare Part D regulations. 
 
Since 2006, Part D of Medicare provides coverage for prescription drugs of older Americans. 
Plans under Part D are also known as Medicare Rx plans. Once you are eligible for Medicare, 
you can enroll in one of the new prescription drug plans under Medicare Part D.  
 
Introduction (part 2, last sentence) for respondents with stand-alone Part D plans:  
 
You have told us earlier that you are enrolled in such a plan. 
 
Introduction (part 2, last sentence) for all other respondents:  
 
You have told us earlier that you are not enrolled in such a plan - either because you have 
coverage from other sources or because you decided not to enroll in a Medicare Rx plan. 
 
The choice task was as follows: 
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Please consider a situation in which you would have no prescription drug coverage from any 
other source. Imagine that these were the only three description drug plans that you could choose 
from. You can also choose not to have coverage at all. 
 
• Basic Plan premium: $ PB This plan covers all prescription drugs you currently use and 
most of what you might need in the future. It has a deductible of $250, pays 75 percent of 
costs above $250 up to $2250, provides no additional benefit until costs reach $5100, and 
pays 95 percent of costs above that level. 
 
• Enhanced Plan premium: $ PE This plan is equivalent to the Basic Plan but has no 
deductible. This means that the 75 percent coverage begins at the first dollar you spend 
on description drugs, up to $2250. Like the Basic Plan, there are no additional benefits 
until costs reach $5100. The Enhanced Plan pays 95 percent of costs above that level. 
 
• Premier plan premium: $ PP This plan is equivalent to the Enhanced Plan, but is does 
not impose a coverage gap between $2250 and $5100. So it pays 75 percent of all costs 
up to $5100 and for 95 percent above that amount. 
 
• No prescription drug insurance at all 
 
The three treatment variables (dollar premiums) PB, PE, and PP (for the basic, enhanced, and 
premium plans, respectively) were assigned randomly according. There were 26 treatments, each 
with equal probability. The values of the treatment variables are listed in Table A.1. 
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Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of respondents in HRS 2006 and RPS 2006 
 
  HRS 2006  RPS 2006 
    unweigthed weigthed   unweigthed weigthed 
Gender Female 57.3% 56.8%  55.8% 57.2% 
  Male 42.7% 43.2%   44.2% 42.8% 
Race White 83.5% 89.3%  87.6% 83.3% 
  Non-white 16.5% 10.7%   12.4% 16.7% 
Age 61 – 70 35.8% 33.7%  39.3% 35.9% 
 71 – 80 40.3% 41.6%  46.9% 47.9% 
 81 – 90 20.4% 22.0%  12.9% 15.1% 
  >90 3.5% 2.7%   0.9% 1.1% 
Education Less than HS 31.5% 28.3%  12.9% 26.1% 
 High school 32.6% 33.4%  41.5% 36.5% 
  More than HS 36.0% 38.4%   45.6% 37.5% 
Income <$20K 33.2% 31.2%  23.4% 28.9% 
 $20K – $60K 46.2% 46.9%  58.2% 52.6% 
  >$60K 20.6% 21.9%   18.4% 18.5% 
SRHS excellent 8.5% 9.1%  6.1% 5.6% 
 very good 26.3% 27.5%  32.2% 27.8% 
 good 31.6% 32.4%  39.5% 41.8% 
 fair 23.3% 22.2%  18.1% 19.8% 
  poor 10.3% 8.8%   4.0% 4.9% 
Number of observations 11399     1666   
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Table 2: Variable description and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. N 
 
    
Hypothetical choices 
     
Attributes of plans chosen by RPS respondents    
Insurance = 1 if Part D stand-alone coverage 0.85 0.35 1525 
No deductible = 1 if Insurance without deductible 0.68 0.47 1525 
Gap coverage = 1 if Insurance with gap coverage 0.36 0.48 1525 
Premium Refer to table 4    
     
Real choices 
     
Attributes of plans chosen by RPS respondents    
Insurance = 1 if Part D stand-alone coverage 0.79 0.41 470 
No deductible  = 1 if Plan offers benefits without the $250 
deductible of the standard plan 
0.49 0.50 470 
Gap coverage 
(generics) 
= 1 if Generic drugs covered in the 
coverage gap of the standard plan 
0.07 0.26 470 
Gap coverage  
(brand-name 
drugs) 
= 1 if In addition to generics, brand-name 
drugs also covered in the coverage gap 
0.03 0.18 470 
 
    
     
Health and prescription drug spending 
   
Drug costs Total drug costs in 2005, constructed from 
RPS 2005 (see Winter et al., 2006) 
2554.30 3118.45 1569 
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 Table 3: Monthly plan premiums in the hypothetical and real markets (in dollars) 
 
Hypothetical market (set by design) Basic Enhanced 
 
Premium 
First choice  Fixed premium 30.79 37.68  50.33 
Second and third choice Lowest premium 15.39 18.94  25.16 
    Highest premium 40.02 49.25  65.43 
Real market  Basic Enhanced Generics Generics & brand 
All available plans (market average) 30.75 37.92 48.13 61.88 
Plans chosen by RPS respondents (sample average) 17.00 26.60 46.10 60.80 
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Table 4: Multinomial logit models estimated separately for real and hypothetical choice data  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Real  Hypothetical  
   
Premium -0.0762*** -0.0323*** 
 (0.00609) (0.00777) 
Insurance 0.980*** 0.964*** 
 (0.206) (0.278) 
No deductible 1.123*** 0.718*** 
 (0.200) (0.130) 
Gap coverage (generics) 0.184  
 (0.277)  
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 1.565*** 0.489*** 
 (0.396) (0.135) 
Drug tiers -0.927***  
 (0.231)  
Top 100 drugs uncovered -0.109***  
 (0.0132)  
Top 100 with authorization -0.0789***  
 (0.0126)  
   
Observations 18,185 4,812 
Number of groups 410 1203 
Log likelihood -1144 -1613 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 5: Monthly WTP estimates obtained from separate MNL models (using the delta method) 
 
 
(1) 
Real 
(2) 
Hypothetical 
Insurance 12.86*** 29.86*** 
 (2.93) (4.35) 
No deductible 14.73*** 22.25*** 
 (2.97) (5.30) 
Gap coverage (generics) 2.41  
 (3.58)  
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 20.53*** 15.15*** 
 (5.10)  
Drug tiers -12.16***  
 (3.51)  
Top 100 drugs uncovered -1.44***  
 (0.22)  
Top 100 with authorization -1.04***  
 (0.18)  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 6: Ratios of WTPS for hypothetical and real decisions  
 
 
  WTP(Hypo)/WTP(Real) [95% confidence interval] 
    Insurance 2.32 [1.34    , 3.30] 
    No deductible 1.51 [0.66    , 2.37] 
    Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 0.74 [0.27    , 1.20] 
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Table 7: Multinomial logit models estimated with combined real and hypothetical choice data 
 
    
  (3) (4) (5) 
     
       
Premium -0.0545*** -0.0647*** -0.0762*** 
 (0.00429) (0.00603) (0.00600) 
Insurance 1.416*** 1.378*** 0.980*** 
 (0.187) (0.240) (0.229) 
Insurance * Hypothetical   1.296*** 
   (0.338) 
No deductible 1.002*** 1.555*** 1.123*** 
 (0.116) (0.220) (0.201) 
No deductible *  Hypothetical   0.574 
   (0.445) 
Gap coverage (generics) 0.147 0.0989 0.184 
 (0.190) (0.197) (0.262) 
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 0.754*** 1.163*** 1.565*** 
 (0.104) (0.292) (0.392) 
Gap coverage (brand-name) * Hypothetical   -0.410 
   (0.451) 
Drug tiers -1.372*** -1.666*** -0.927*** 
 (0.121) (0.178) (0.217) 
Top 100 drugs uncovered -0.136*** -0.119*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0165) 
Top 100 with authorization -0.104*** -0.0982*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0147) 
Heteroskedasticity Parameter  -0.762*** -0.860*** 
  (0.237) (0.252) 
Observations 22,997 22,997 22,997 
Number of groups 1,613 1,613 1,613 
log likelihood -2781 -2771 -2757 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 8: Monthly WTP estimates obtained from MNL models with combined hypothetical and 
real choice data (using the delta method) 
 
 (3) (4) 
Insurance 25.96*** 21.29*** 
 (2.40) (3.58) 
No deductible 18.40*** 24.03*** 
 (2.25) (3.14) 
Gap coverage (generics) 2.70 1.53 
 (3.48) (3.03) 
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 13.83*** 17.97*** 
 (1.83) (4.03) 
Drug tiers -25.15*** -25.74*** 
 (3.06) (3.40) 
Top 100 drugs uncovered -2.49*** -1.84*** 
 (0.42) (0.39) 
Top 100 with authorization -1.90*** -1.52*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 32
Table 9: Mixed logit models estimated with combined real and hypothetical choice data 
 
 
 (6) (6) (7) (7) 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
     
Premium -0.0686***  -0.0796***  
 (0.00515)  (0.00506)  
Gap coverage (generics) -0.382  -0.366  
 (0.257)  (0.281)  
Drug tiers -1.402***  -1.322***  
 (0.148)  (0.148)  
Top 100 drugs uncovered -0.117***  -0.111***  
 (0.0135)  (0.0133)  
Top 100 with authorization -0.102***  -0.109***  
 (0.0129)  (0.0136)  
Insurance 3.073*** 3.389*** 3.263*** 3.222*** 
 (0.327) (0.379) (0.321) (0.315) 
No deductible 1.376*** 1.835*** -0.340 2.027*** 
 (0.146) (0.180) (0.235) (0.297) 
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 0.456** 2.450*** -0.620*** 1.443*** 
 (0.187) (0.209) (0.191) (0.130) 
     
Observations 22,997 22,997 22,997 22,997 
Number of groups 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,613 
log likelihood -2402 -2402 -2439 -2439 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 10: WTP estimates obtained from mixed logit models with combined hypothetical and real 
choice data 
 
  Coef. Std. Err. p Distribution 
     
Insurance    N(44.80, 49.40) 
No deductible    N(20.05, 26.75) 
Gap Coverage (brandname)    N(6.65,  35.71) 
Gap Coverage (generics) -5.58 3.88 0.15  
Drug Tiers -20.45 2.85 0.00  
Top 100 drugs uncovered -1.70 0.25 0.00  
Top 100 drugs with authorization -1.49 0.20 0.00  
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Table 11: Extended specification testing for adverse selection 
 
Explanatory variables (8) (9) (10) 
Premium -0.0550*** -0.0643*** -0.0763*** 
 (0.00434) (0.00583) (0.00603) 
Insurance 1.208*** 1.052*** 0.590** 
 (0.204) (0.260) (0.259) 
Insurance * Highcost 0.930*** 1.516*** 1.444*** 
 (0.294) (0.418) (0.346) 
No deductible 0.934*** 1.432*** 1.163*** 
 (0.131) (0.230) (0.212) 
No deductible * Highcost 0.220 0.166 -0.0997 
 (0.198) (0.242) (0.238) 
Gap coverage (generics) 0.139 0.0601 0.184 
 (0.190) (0.202) (0.262) 
Gap coverage (brand-name drugs) 0.492*** 0.541** 0.972* 
 (0.131) (0.234) (0.559) 
Gap coverage (brand-name) * Highcost 0.623*** 1.271*** 1.120* 
 (0.200) (0.416) (0.634) 
Drug tiers -1.390*** -1.629*** -0.926*** 
 (0.124) (0.174) (0.217) 
Top 100 drugs uncovered -0.136*** -0.120*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0165) 
Top 100 with authorization -0.105*** -0.0994*** -0.0790*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0153) (0.0147) 
Insurance * Hypothetical   1.341*** 
   (0.371) 
Insurance * Highcost * Hypothetical   0.137 
   (0.797) 
No deductible * Hypothetical   0.221 
   (0.444) 
No deductible * Highcost * Hypothetical   0.956 
   (0.645) 
Gap coverage (brand-name) * Hypothetical   -0.399 
   (0.607) 
Gap coverage (brand-name) * Hypothetical * Highcost   0.212 
   (0.777) 
Heteroskedasticity parameter  -0.653*** -0.825*** 
  (0.174) (0.254) 
    
Observations 22,997 ,997 22,997 
log likelihood -2728 -2718 -2701 
Number of groups 1,613 1,613 1,613 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table A.1: Values of the treatment variables in the hypothetical choice experiment in RPS 2006 
 
Treatment 
PB 
basic plan premium 
PE 
enhanced plan premimum 
PP 
premium plan premium 
1 15.39 18.94 25.16 
2 15.39 18.94 31.38 
3 15.39 18.94 35.12 
4 15.39 22.49 28.71 
5 15.39 22.49 34.93 
6 15.39 22.49 38.67 
7 15.39 24.62 30.84 
8 15.39 24.62 37.06 
9 15.39 24.62 40.80 
10 30.79 34.34 40.56 
11 30.79 34.34 46.78 
12 30.79 34.34 50.52 
13 30.79 37.88 44.1 
14 30.79 37.88 54.06 
15 30.79 40.01 46.23 
16 30.79 40.01 52.45 
17 30.79 40.01 56.19 
18 40.02 43.57 49.79 
19 40.02 43.57 56.01 
20 40.02 43.57 59.75 
21 40.02 47.12 53.34 
22 40.02 47.12 59.56 
23 40.02 47.12 63.3 
24 40.02 49.25 55.47 
25 40.02 49.25 61.69 
26 40.02 49.25 65.43 
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Figure 1: Distributions of WTP estimation from mixed logit models with normal distribution  
 
 
 
 
